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A development and underdevelopment is presented using a Schumpeterian model
for an open global economy with technology transfer and trade. When in the con-
text of free commerce there exist strong enough mechanisms allowing technological
asymmetries between countries to generate higher innovation incentives for the
leaders, persistent inequality and divergence will result. Identical countries will
reach diﬀerent steady states. Such mechanisms include labor- and market- seeking
foreign direct investment (FDI), which originated at the end of the 19th Century
and has increased rapidly since the 1980’s. They also include the typical “colonial
diktat” imposed by Great Britain in the 19th and early 20th Centuries. In the pres-
ence of labor-seeking FDI, the advantage a leading country’s innovators obtains
by producing with the follower’s wages results in higher incentives to innovation
for which FDI spillovers may not compensate the follower. It also crowds out the
follower’s innovation. In the case of a small following country all of whose labor
is demanded by leading country innovators, all innovation will be crowded out (the
banana republic). Market-seeking FDI, providing goods that can only be sold where
they are produced, also results in unequal incentives to innovation. Finally, when
colonies’ markets and transportation options are limited by their colonial masters,
or competitive industries are directly outruled, as in the typical colonial diktat of
the 19th Century, persistent inequality and divergence arise. In contrast, in the
case of autarchy, or in the case of free commerce without any asymmetric mech-
anisms, multiple steady states will only arise when country parameters diﬀer. In
all cases considered, marginal changes in the steady state determinants, such as
population size, productivity ﬁxed eﬀects and institutions (represented by the de-
gree of ﬁnancial development and by the eﬃciency of a public input for producing
innovated goods) result in growth eﬀects for diverging countries and level eﬀects
for countries following the leader in parallel trajectories.
21. Introduction
Globalization is considered to be a powerful instrument for world-wide conver-
gence. This assessment is supported by most theories of both economic growth
and trade. These theories usually imply that free trade and investment across
countries will lead to equalization in growth rates and productivity levels. How-
ever, these predictions bear fruit unevenly. On the one hand trade has been asso-
ciated with the emergence of modern growth and prosperity in Western Europe
and North America since its inception, with the development of whole groups of
countries such as Japan and the Asian tigers more recently, and with convergence
episodes such as Spain’s with the European Economic Community and more re-
cently China’s. On the other, in that very context of world trade and increasing
globalization of which economic growth is a part, a great divergence of incomes
took place,1 characterized by large technological diﬀerences across countries,2 in
which the underdeveloped world was left behind. This process of divergence con-
tinued through the second half of the 20th Century3. For whole blocks of countries,
recent policies of trade and investment liberalization have been far less successful
than economists had expected in light of the theory. This unequal pattern for
the eﬀects of trade on growth can be understood as club-convergence, as a series
of authors have suggested.4 Countries may belong to clubs whose growth tra-
jectories are characterized by diﬀerences in levels or growth rates, corresponding
perhaps to the more intuitive concepts of development and underdevelopment (or
subdivisions thereof).
This paper develops a Schumpeterian theoretical framework to examine the
interaction of international trade and investment with the incentives for innova-
tion. First we show that in the autarchic as well as the free commerce (free trade
of domestically produced goods, excluding foreign investment) regimes, identi-
1Pritchett (1997) estimates that the proportional gap in per-capita GDP between the richest
and poorest countries worsened by a factor of ﬁve between 1870 and 1990. Similarly, according
to Maddison (2001) this gap grew from 3 in 1820 to 19 in 1998.
2A large number of empirical studies attribute cross-country diﬀerences in per-capita GDP
to diﬀerent in productivity (Easterly and Levine, 2001; Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare, 1997;
Knight, Loayza and Villanueva, 1993; Islam, 1995; Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort, 1996; Prescott,
1998; Hall and Jones, 1999; Feyrer, 2001).
3The proportional per-capita income gap between Mayer-Foulkes’s (2002) richest and poorest
convergence groups grew by a factor of 2.6 between 1960 and 1995, and the proportional gap
between Maddison’s richest and poorest groups grew by a factor of 1.75 between 1950 and 1998.
4Baumol (1986), Durlauf and Johnson (1995), Quah (1993, 1997) and Mayer-Foulkes (2002,
2003).
3cal countries will converge.5 Free commerce deﬁnes a “level playing ﬁeld” be-
tween countries by making wages proportional to technological levels. Innovation
in lagging countries responds to the same incentive for world proﬁts as leading
countries. However, it obtains higher than proportional returns to innovation in-
vestment aimed at achieving proportional productivity jumps, because they have
access to the more advanced contemporary knowledge of the leading countries.
Therefore they are able to converge. This is Gerschenkron’s (1952) advantage of
backwardness in technological change. In this context, one implication is that only
institutional and other diﬀerences in country-speciﬁc characteristics will lead to
persistent inequality and divergence. However, in the presence of trade, countries
enter a competition for dominance in innovation sectors. Free commerce raises
the world growth rate (and therefore leading country income) only if the increased
incentives for innovation in leading countries (whose growth rate deﬁnes the world
growth rate) is not counteracted by the loss of too many innovation sectors to the
lagging countries with which they trade. On the other hand, lagging countries’
relative income will depend on the success of their innovative sectors, the ﬁxed
eﬃciency gains from trade and the size of their trade partners.
Globalization includes, besides commerce, mechanisms that can exploit the
technological asymmetries between countries and generate persistent inequality
and divergence. During the second half of the 20th Century, it has been charac-
terized by the ever-stronger presence of foreign direct investment (FDI). All mod-
ern “free trade” agreements are agreements for free commerce and investment,
allowing for the full scope of modern globalization to proceed. The mechanisms
we examine theoretically here are labor- and market-seeking FDI, as well as a
typical colonial diktat. In fact, investment, and assuring markets for innovative
sectors, may be stronger forces for globalization then commerce. Moreover, dom-
inant countries tend to ﬂout the principles of free trade when they are perceived
to run against their interests, as in the case of agricultural goods.
Labor-seeking FDI allows leading countries to take advantage of lower wages in
lagging countries. This raises innovation proﬁts for leading countries only, under-
mining the “level playing ﬁeld”. This also introduces a new element in innovation
competition, because ﬁrms performing FDI can aﬀord higher wages than their
local competitors and can therefore price them out. This is innovation crowding
5Since its very origins, the policy of “Free Trade” includes not only commerce but also
mechanisms that favor the enrichment of the leading countries, such as foreign investment or
restricted competition for the home industry. Note that commerce is an essential condition for
FDI, unless all proﬁt sa r et ob ee x p o r t e di nk i n d .
4out. If technological spillovers from FDI are not too high and depend on the local
technological level, as empirical studies have shown, then multiple steady states
will arise between identical countries.6 This implies persistent inequality and di-
vergence are possible over and above institutional diﬀerences between countries.
Market-seeking FDI occurs when products can only be sold where they are
produced. Here what occurs is that leading country innovators can produce in
lagging countries and in fact enjoy even higher proﬁts than at home, because
of the lower wages, while innovators from countries lagging too far behind do
not have the technological level to set up business in leading countries because
of high wages. These are unequal innovation incentives. Thus for this class of
goods only leading countries can enjoy world proﬁts when they innovate. Again,
if technological spillovers from FDI are not too high, multiple steady states arise,
implying persistent inequality and divergence between identical countries.
The process of globalization is divided by historians into two periods. The
“First Great Age of Globalization” proceeded during the 19th and early 20th
Century. Great Britain became its undisputed champion. With the advent of
steam engine based manufacturing, Great Britain turned to free trade for ob-
taining raw materials and to sell its industrial products. Free trade became a
more eﬃcient policy for enrichment than colonialism (Beaudreau, 2004; Semmel
1970). Two main mechanisms exploited the technological asymmetry between
Great Britain and its colonies. The ﬁrst, which I describe more fully and model
below, was the imposition of a “colonial contract” deﬁn i n gt r a d es oa st op r o v i d e
raw materials and to prevent industrial competition from the colony (Bairoch,
1997). The second was the presence of large scale FDI, which had made its ap-
pearance by the end of the 19th Century.7,8.T h i sp o i n tw a sm a d eb yL e n i ni nh i s
6Determinants of the intensity of FDI spillovers include: a suﬃciently qualiﬁed labor force
(Borensztein et al., 1998; Blonigen and Wang, 2004), not too large a technological gap (De
Mello, 1997), a suﬃcient level of economic development (Blomström et al., 1994; Mayer and
Nunnenkamp, 2005), suﬃcient ﬁnancial development (Alfaro et al., 2001), openness to trade
(Balasubramanyam et al., 1996).
7By 1899 giant corporations such as the United Fruit Company controlled 90 per cent of
US banana imports; Royal Dutch/Shell accounted in 1914 for 20 per cent of Russia’s total
oil production. Standard Oil of New Jersey, Singer, International Harvester, Western Electric,
and by 1914, Ford Motor Company had major producing facilities outside the United States
(Beaudreau, 2004).
8The basic features of globalization were present even in ancient times. As early as the
third century B.C. the conquest of the Persian Empire by Alexander the Great paved the
way for trade and cultural contacts between the Greeks and other civilizations to the East.
In essence, through the movement of goods, people, money and ideas, a highly sophisticated
51916 Imperialism the Highest Stage of Capitalism, which criticized vast accumu-
lations of capital invested abroad at a far higher rate of return than in the home
country. In the colonial and dependent countries investments were a source of
super proﬁts, due to extremely cheap labor and raw materials. Svedberg (1978)
estimates that some 44 to 60 % of the $19 billion of accumulated investment in
developing countries in 1913-14 were in the form of direct investment.
The process of globalization was broken between 1914 and 1945 by the two
world wars and the global depression, as well as a change in hegemony. A sec-
ond stage of globalization emerged in the post-war period, headed by the United
States, which by 1960 owned almost half of the world’s outward stock of FDI.
FDI has grown enormous since the 1980’s (UNCTAD, 1999). Worldwide outﬂows
have increased nearly 29% a year on average since 1983, three times the growth of
world exports. Most of this FDI is attributable to the world’s 60,000 transnational
corporations, who now produce about a quarter of world economic output. Their
foreign aﬃliates had combined sales of about US $11 trillion in 1998 compared
with world exports of US $7 trillion, an indication of the size of transnational
production relative to international trade (UNCTAD, 1999).9
Our model thus ﬁnds that when mechanisms such as FDI exist by which lead-
ing countries can exploit the technological asymmetries between countries, multi-
ple steady states are possible for identical countries. This implies that purely
economic forces can generate persistent inequality and divergence of identical
economies. This provides a Schumpeterian theory deﬁning underdevelopment as
belonging to a lower steady state in which the incentives for innovation do not lead
t oc a t c hu pw i t ht h el e a d i n gc o u n t r i e s .W eﬁnd two kinds of lower steady states.
In the lowest, the lagging economy will have a lower growth rate than the leading
economy. This implies that any policy improving the innovation rate, either di-
rectly or indirectly, will have growth eﬀects. In the middle steady states, a ﬁxed
commercial network evolved to globalize the greater Mediterranean region-over 2,000 years ago!
(http://www.business.uconn.edu/redirect/CIBER/siteﬁles/resourceguides/vol3/3-2.1.pdf )
9The biggest monopolies today are very multinational in their scope and spread across
the globe. The Swiss electrical engineering giant ABB has facilities in 140 nations. Royal
Dutch/Shell explores for oil in 50 countries and reﬁnes in 34. US food processor HJ Heinz
covers six continents. Cargill, the largest US grain company, operates in 54 countries. ICI,
Britain’s leading chemical company, has manufacturing operations in 40 nations and sales af-
ﬁliates in 150. BP has 100,000 employees and operates in 100 countries. Of the world’s one
hundred largest economies, 51 are corporations and 49 are nations. Wal-Mart is larger than the
economies of 100 countries including Portugal, Israel and Ireland. (Cited from corpwatch.org
with slight punctuation changes, http://home.clear.net.nz/pages/wpnz/jly31-00-3rdworld.htm)
6relative lag is maintained in relation to leading countries. These middle steady
states explain a not suﬃciently well-recognized stylized fact, the persistence of
middle income levels. For example, the average per-capita income relative to the
US of 19 Latin American countries actually decreased between 1960, 1999 from
0.25 to 0.20.10 The relative level 0.20 represents a lag of around 80 years to the
US, assuming an almost impossible catch up rate of 2% per year above the US
growth rate! The importance of this middle income persistence tends to be ne-
glected. It is believed that, since these countries grew at an average rate of 1.5%
instead of 2.1%, it must be just a matter of ﬁne tuning to get at least parallel
growth, which is deemed to be a suﬃcient objective. The point, however, is that
if a trap is maintaining the level diﬀerence, or divergence, unlocking it would lead
to miracle growth and enormous welfare gains. Ignoring it, on the contrary, may
doom economic policies.
We stress multiple steady states for identical countries to show that asymmetri-
cal innovation incentives can on their own explain, in the context of globalization,
the long-term persistence of unequal incomes and divergence. Of course, factors
such as geography and institutions can aﬀect the eﬃciency of resource allocation
and the incentives for innovation and therefore have an impact on long-term pro-
ductivity growth rates. But they are not necessary ingredients for an explanation.
We have argued that FDI can give rise to innovation crowding out and to
unequal innovation incentives. To highlight the plausibility and extent of these
phenomena we illustrate the point by examining present day world motor vehi-
cle production and consumption (Table I). Automobiles represent a fairly ma-
ture product with a not particularly impressive rate of innovation. Many middle
income countries are quite capable of engineering and producing a line of auto-
mobiles; however, to do this facing the competition of established and advanced
producers may be impossible. What do we see in Table I? Those countries in Eu-
rope and North America that developed the automobile continue to produce and
trade automobiles, both with each other and with other countries. In contrast,
the new producers of automobiles, mainly Japan and Korea, do not import au-
tomobiles. These countries developed their capabilities in automobile production
by promoting their exports and performing a full import substitution, eliminating
10Of the 19 countries for which the relevant data is availabel in the World Bank data
base (http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/GDNdata.htm) collected by Easterly and
Sewadeh, the relative position of Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay
and Venezuela worsened while that of Brazil Dominican Republic, Mexico and Panama ad-
vanced slightly.
7all competition from FDI in automobiles. On the other hand, Latin American
countries that supposedly “substituted for imports” in fact allowed FDI in auto-
mobiles. Consequently, in the presence of innovation crowding out and unequal
innovation incentives, they did not develop their own industries.
The discussion on the role of institutions usually places emphasis on how these
improve the incentives for investment and innovation through, for example, prop-
erty rights and eﬀective contractual arrangements. What becomes apparent in
the model and the examples above, though, is the important role that institu-
tions play in recognizing and implementing policies favoring the country’s own
long-term self-interest. This implies, ﬁrst of all, having enough coordination and
agreement between a country’s various sectors. Japan and later other East Asian
countries were jealously concerned with their technological independence, and
devised economic policies that ensured their technological capabilities and inde-
pendence. The government was able to take a leading, credible, eﬀective role in
their implementation. By contrast, in Latin America rent-seeking elites were not
eﬀectively concerned with the dependency that resulted from FDI.11,12
The rest of this article is organized as follows. First we introduce the basic
framework, including innovation, production and consumption.. Next, we close
the model for the cases of autarchy, free commerce, colonial diktat, labor-seeking
FDI, and market-seeking FDI, proving the stated results. Conclusions follow.
11The degree to which a country puts into place policies eﬀectively promoting its self-interest
may be somewhat orthogonal to whether it is democratic or autocratic, at least partly explaining
Barro’s (1991) weak ﬁndings for democracy as a variable promoting economic growth.
12Some political scientists have proposed that countries which have faced the extreme orga-
nizational necessities of war with other countries have developed stronger institutions. This
may be one reason that East Asian and Western European countries, as well as the US, have
stronger institutions that eﬀectively pursue their self-interest, as compared, for example, to
Latin America.
82. The basic framework
We cast a Schumpeterian growth model in a simple discrete-time framework fol-
lowing Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2002), Howitt, and Mayer-Foulkes, D.
(2005) and Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005). The model will cover the
autarchic case, free commerce, colonial diktat, and labor- and market- seeking
FDI. In the autarchic case there are m countries who make use of each others’
technological ideas; once commerce is included (an essential condition for FDI),
m =2 .
There is a continuum of general goods indexed by i ∈ [0,1],p r o d u c e dw i t h
labor and used for consumption and innovation. These will be tradeable. Each
country has a ﬁxed population Lj,j=1 ,...,m consisting of a continuum of
individuals. Everyone lives for two periods, being endowed with one unit of labor
services in the second period. A continuum of individuals i ∈ [0,1] is born each
generation who may attempt to manage a research ﬁr mf o ri n n o v a t i o no nt h eith
good during the ﬁrst period of their life. Generation t has an intertemporal linear
utility function13
Ut = u1t + δu2t+1,
where 0 < δ < 1 and each period’s utility is Cobb-Douglass,
ukt =e x p





ckt(i) is the amount of good i consumed in period k and time t. The real interest
rate is given by 1+r = δ
−1.
2.1. General goods, productivity and innovation
The economy has inﬁnitely many small producers who can produce any good i at
a generally available productivity level At,a c c o r d i n gt ot h ep r o d u c t i o nf u n c t i o n
Yt (i)=ϕAtLt (i), (2.1)
where Lt (i) is the labor dedicated to the production of good i,a n dϕ is a ﬁxed
productivity eﬀect.
13Linear utility implies that people are indiﬀerent between investing in any country, whether
technologically or ﬁnancially developed or not. We assume that all investment is locally ﬁnanced,
but if δ were the same across all countries we could allow perfect capital mobility with no change
in the analysis.
9Technological change is assumed to be costly. At time t − 1 the ith innovator
may attempt to make a technological jump of magnitude Γ > 1 in the production
function so as to obtain a productivity ΓAt for good i. In the autarchic case,
innovators will decide to innovate according to their expected proﬁt. In the open
case this decision will be embedded in a game deﬁning who wins the race, she or
her competing ith analogue in the other country. When she succeeds (innovates),
she will form a large ﬁrm which will be the ith incumbent at time t. Let µt (i) be
the probability that if she attempts to innovate she succeeds. Then:
At (i)=
 
ΓAt with probability µt (i),
At with probability 1 − µt (i).
 
Goods i for which an innovation has just occurred are produced according to








where Pt (i) is a public good necessary to produce the recently innovated ith
good and χ is an eﬃciency parameter associated with the combination of private
and public goods, which must satisfy χΓ > 1. The public input in production
function (2.2) is plausible because technological change often requires a public
input, such as roads, railroad tracks, airports, the electricity distribution network,
the “internet superhighway”, new regulations, and so on. It is introduced for two
reasons. The ﬁrst is to simplify the model by making aggregate labor demand
neutral to innovation, as will be seen below. This is the reason behind the choice
of the ratio χΓ−1 between public and private labor.14 The second is to provide a
means to discuss the impact of a public eﬃciency parameter χ speciﬁcally related




We suppose that labor is allocated in the optimal ratio of private to public labor:
L
P
t (i)=( χΓ − 1)Lt (i).
Then the privately perceived production function for innovated goods is analogous
to the one for competitive goods,
Yt (i)=ϕχΓAt (i)Lt (i), (2.4)
14A ﬁxed proportions production function is chosen to simplify the analysis of public inputs
i nt h ec a s eo fF D I .
10except that its technological level is higher, the eﬃciency parameter χ is present,
and society as a whole pays (through lump sum taxation) for LP
t (i) additional
units of labor. Recall that the incumbent faces the competition of a competitive
fringe of small producers who can produce the same good with production function
(2.1) at technological level At.
We assume on the one hand that the incumbent’s speciﬁc knowledge disappears
at her death.15 On the other hand, we assume that there is a general diﬀusion
of knowledge of production within each country. Hence the next period’s shared
technological level will be:
At+1 =( 1+µt (Γ − 1))At. (2.5)
2.2. Consumer and producer optimization
The Cobb-Douglass consumer utility for each period implies that consumers ded-
icate an equal expenditure to each good i. Competitively produced goods are sold
at their cost pt (i)=wt/(ϕAt). Innovative producers face a competitive fringe
selling at this price, and a constant expenditure. Therefore they minimize costs
by reducing production to the minimum level compatible with price pt (i).T h a t
is, all goods are produced in the same quantity and at the same price. Innovators
make a proﬁts ol o n ga sχΓ > 1, the assumption made above.
General goods will be demanded both for consumption and research. As shown
below, demand for innovation will have the same proportional structure as for con-
sumption. Let Bt be the aggregate expenditure on goods, for both consumption
and research, equal to nominal GNP, let Yt (i) be the total production of each
good, and deﬁne
Yt =e x p










real GDP. Real aggregate demand Bt/pt depends on whether the economy is closed
or open, and on the conditions on innovation imposed by the presence of labor-
or market- seeking FDI. Observe that real wages are wjt/pjt = ϕjAjt.
15Alternatively we could assume that by the next period the set of general goods i ∈ [0,1] is
irrelevant to consumption and innovation, having been replaced by technological progress by a
new set of general goods.
112.3. Research
At the end of period t−1, production will be allocated between consumption and
investment in research. Introduce the index j for countries. Innovative ﬁrms will
have access to a knowledge level Ajt, resulting from the previous knowledge level
Ajt−1 and from the diﬀusion of the new knowledge level ΓAjt−1 at a rate µjt−1.
Let the R&D investment needed to obtain a technological jump Γ at any given








Njt−1 =e x p





Here Njt−1 (i) is the quantity of good i used in research. This production function
has the same kernel as the utility function and thus consumption and research
demand for goods i will be proportional. Investment in innovation simply trans-
fers some constant proportion of the consumption of each good to innovation,
and Njit−1 = Njt−1. In (2.7) we divide by Ajt (a level of general knowledge that
is present already in period t − 1) to recognize the “ﬁshing-out” eﬀect: the fur-
ther ahead general knowledge moves, proportionally more resources are needed
to obtain the same proportional technological jump Γ. Suppose there is a single
technological leader, country 1, and let ajt = Ajt/A1t < 1 b et h er e l a t i v et e c h -
nological level of country j with respect to leading country 1. Lagging countries
face an identical innovation function to the one the leader faced at previous lev-
els of development, except for the convergence term ψ(ajt). The presence of the
leading country’s technological level A1t implies through technological diﬀusion
that country j will need to invest proportionally less resources than country 1
did in the past to achieve the proportionally equal technological jump Γ.T h i s
is Gerschenkron’s (1952) “advantage of backwardness”, represented here by the
decreasing function
ψ(ajt)=ψ0 − (ψ0 − ψ1)ajt. (2.8)
For the function Ψ yielding the ﬁnal probability of innovation (2.7) we chose
Ψ(n)=1− (1 + n)
−1 . (2.9)
This satisﬁes Ψ(0) = 0,Ψ < 1,Ψ  > 0,Ψ   < 0. As will be apparent below, the
fact that Ψ is bounded allows examining the eﬀects of country size. Note also
that Ψ  (n)=( 1+n)
−2 =( 1− Ψ(n))
2.
12In the absence of credit constraints µjt will be chosen in each sector so as to
maximize the expected real payoﬀ:
µjtπjt
(1 + r)pjt





πjt − Njt−1. (2.10)



















Imperfect credit markets will arise as follows. Innovators may need to borrow over
and above the resources presently available to them. For simplicity, the model has
been structured so that these resources consist of the wages that innovators will
receive in the second period.16 Thus I assume that each entrepreneur at the end
of period t−1 is a young person who can borrow a proportion ηj of her future real
wage income wjt/pt = ϕjAjt at interest rate r in the consumption market.17 To
invest Njt−1 in an R&D project she must further borrow Njt−1− 1
1+rηjyjt in say a
capital venture market. We assume that by paying a cost cjNjt−1 she can defraud
her creditors by hiding the proceeds in the event that the project is successful.
This implies that in equilibrium the entrepreneur cannot borrow more than a
ﬁnite multiple of her available wealth18 1
1+rηjwjt/pt, as in Bernanke and Gertler
(1989), and therefore she cannot invest more than:
νjϕjAjt
in innovation, where νj ∈ [1,∞),am e a s u r eo fﬁnancial development of country
j.is some positive constant depending positively on the hiding cost cj.
16This implies that their resources are proportional to their knowledge level base At rather
than to At−1, hence eliminating a term µt−1 which would render the model a two- rather than
a one-dimensional diﬀerence system.
17This is equivalent to a consumption loan that all workers can access, since they only work
in the second period. In fact, though, they are indiﬀerent to the timing of their consumption.
18See Appendix A to Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005).
133. Autarchy
Consider country j in the absence of trade. Labor demand in each competitive





























 −1 ∈ (0,1).



















Recall, however, that for every unit of private labor used in innovative goods,


























The ﬁrst order conditions for innovation are now given by wjt/pjt = ϕjAjt.
 
1 − µjt
 2 Ω(ajt)=1 , (3.3)
14where Ω(ajt)=ψ(ajt)δπjϕjLj,t h eeﬀective innovation incentives are a decreasing
function of ajt.D e ﬁne the function









f is constant for Ω ≤ 1 and is strictly increasing thereafter. Deﬁne also the

















Note that in the case of the leading country a1t =1so µ1t is a constant which
we assume is positive. We assume that ν1 is large enough that leading country 1
is not credit constrained, so µ1t ≤ µC
1t. The growth rate of this economy, also the






− 1=µ1 (Γ − 1).
3.1. Lagging countries









[1 + µ1 (Γ − 1)]Ajt
=
1+µjt(ajt)(Γ − 1)
1+µ1 (Γ − 1)
ajt.







1+µ1 (Γ − 1)
, (3.6)
for which trajectories can be diagramed in the (ajt,a jt+1/ajt) plane by following
the mapping HA
j and then rectangular hyperbolas to the ajt+1/ajt =1line (see
Figure 1). Positive steady states are given by HA
j (a∗
j)=1 .Thus positive steady




15A stable steady state a∗
j =0exists if HA
j is continuous at 0 and HA
j (0) ≤ 1. On
the other hand, if HA
j is continuous at 1 and HA
j (1) > 1 then country j may
overtake country 1.
Now, the function HA
j (ajt) is decreasing and continuous because Ω and ψ are.
Moreover, it is strictly decreasing unless µjt(ajt)=0in which case HA
j (ajt) < 1.
This means solutions to HA
j (a∗
j)=1are unique.
We can complete our analysis of autarchy, recapitulating the main theoretical
ﬁndings of Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005). These include now an
overtaking result and a comparison between the roles of ﬁnancial development
and other sources of competitiveness..
Proposition 1. Under autarchy, countries fall into four groups.
(1) HA
j (1) > 1.C o u n t r yj will overtake country 1.
(2) HA
j (1) ≤ 1 and HA
j (0) ≥ 1.C o u n t r y j converges in growth rates to
country 1. A unique steady state 0 ≤ a∗
j ≤ 1 exists given by HA
j (a∗
j)=1 .A tt h i s
steady state there are two possibilities.
(i) Country j is credit constrained: µjt(ajt)=µC
jt(ajt)=Ψ(ψ(ajt)νjϕj).I n
this case marginal improvements in νj will result in marginal level eﬀects given
by marginal rises in a∗
j.






In this case marginal rises in productivity χj associated with innovation (incre-
menting πj)o ri np o p u l a t i o ns i z eLj will also result in marginal level eﬀects given
by marginal rises in a∗
j.
In addition, in both cases marginal rises in ﬁxed productivity eﬀects ϕj will
result in marginal level eﬀects.
(3) HA
j (0) < 1. In this case the steady state is a∗
j =0 .C o u n t r yj diverges in
growth rates from country 1. The growth rate is µjt(0)(Γ − 1) <g 1
Again there are two cases:
(i) Country j is credit constrained: µjt(0) = µC
jt(0) = Ψ(ψ0νjϕj). In this case,
when HA
j (0) < 1,m a r g i n a li m p r o v e m e n t si nνj will result in growth eﬀects.






In this case marginal rises in productivity χj associated with innovation (in-
crementing πj) or in population size Lj will also result in growth eﬀects when
HA
j (0) < 1.
In both cases marginal rises in ﬁxed productivity eﬀects ϕj will result in growth
eﬀects.




t→∞Gjt = Ajt+1/Ajt − 1=( 1+g1) lim
t→∞(at+1/at) − 1
=( 1 + g1)H
A (0) − 1
= µjt(0)(Γ − 1) <g 1.
In the autarchic case, identical economies have the same steady states in-
dependently of their initial conditions, Galor’s (1996) deﬁnition of convergence,
which now also applies to “converging” to a divergent state. To see this, suppose
χj = ϕj = Lj =1 , so that πj = π =1− Γ−1,a n dνj = ν.
Proposition 2.
(1) Under autarchy, identical countries have the same steady states.
(2) Under autarchy, if a country has a higher steady state, it must have higher
ﬁxed productivity eﬀects ϕj, higher productivity eﬀects associated with innovation
χj, a higher population Lj, or a better ﬁnancial system νj.
P r o o f .( 1 )N o t et h a tµC
jt(ajt) is decreasing in ajt so that since steady states are
given by the condition µjt(a∗
j)=µ1, the assumption that the leading country is
unconstrained implies the lagging country is also unconstrained at a steady state
a∗




j).S i n c e c o u n t r y j is identical to
country 1, HA
j (1) = HA
1 (1) = 1, so the unique steady state is a∗
j =1 . (2) This
follows from Proposition 1 
4. Free commerce
We consider the case of two countries 1 and 2 trading general goods produced in
the home countries, while labor and investment are immobile. Write at for a2t.
4.1. Innovation
Recall that in the autarchic case we assume that there is a single ith ﬁrm attempt-
ing the innovation for good i in each country. In eﬀect this abstracts from the
problem of domestic innovation races. In the multi country this problem must be
considered. The ﬁrst point to observe is that innovation races are ineﬃcient. We
17show in Appendix A that under assumptions compatible to those set out for the
autarchic case, when there is an innovation race the total aggregate of innovation
is less than if both ﬁrms knew from the beginning that only one of them would do
research. This means each ﬁrms would be willing to pay the other not to engage
in research.
Here we are not so much concerned with the particular nature of innovation
races, but in their long term eﬀects on economic growth. We shall ﬁnd that in
some situations, when one of the innovators would clearly win a price war, the
competition situation after innovation is enough to determine a winner. In other
situations the results could be indeterminate or depend on a variety of other
situations. Thus we simply assume that ﬁrms in country j innovate in a measure
ωj of sectors, with ω1 + ω2 =1 . We are then free to examine several scenarios.
For example, we can assume identical countries have ω1 = ω2. Instead, we can
also examine endogenous winning set measures ωj(at). Finally, we shall assume
ω1 =1and ω2 =0will arise endogenously if a price war after innovation would
be won by the leader.
4.2. Production, consumption and commerce
Suppose that as a result of the innovation process each country j has innovated in a
measure ωjµj ≥ 0 of sectors. Also suppose for deﬁniteness that each competitively
produced general good is produced in just one country, and that each country







All goods will still be consumed in equal quantities Yt and at the same price pt.




















where Bt/pt is aggregate world expenditure, and proﬁts are πjt = πjBt.
184.2.1. Both countries produce competitive goods
















































The assumption of trade balance is implicit in the model, with each country




































where φ = ϕ2/ϕ1.
194.2.2. One country specializes in innovated goods
If for example ξ2t < 0, this means that county 2 cannot meet the world demand
of goods it has innovated in. It thus specializes in produces innovated goods while
country 1 produces any shortfall in their supply by producing these competitively
(at the same price). Suppose Country 2 distributes its labor equally amongst its








so that country 2’s total product is: Y2t = ϕ2χ2ΓA2tL2.On the other hand country
1 distributes its labor (including that used for the production of public goods)
according to






















[ξ1t + ω1µ1t + ω2µ2t]=ϕ1χ1A1tL1 + ϕ2χ2ΓA2tL2 (4.8)
In this case proﬁts in each country are given by:
π1t
pt







When country 1 specializes, the same expressions hold with indices 1 and 2
interchanged. Note that both countries cannot specialize in innovation since
ω1µ1t + ω2µ2t < ω1 + ω2 =1 .
4.3. The two-country dynamics
Consider ﬁrst the case when neither of the countries specializes in innovative




















The function f is increasing. On the other hand Ω1t(at) is increasing while Ω2t(at)
and µC
2t(at) are decreasing. Hence µ1t(at) is increasing while µ2t(at) is decreasing.
We will assume the leading economy is unconstrained, that is, the desired inno-
vation rate is less than the constrained innovation rate µC
1t ≡ Ψ(ψ1ν1ϕ1).










t L1 + ϕ2L2
 
.
The innovation rate of country 1 is the minimum between the desired and con-
straint rates,












where µ = f0 (x) solves (1 − µ)
2 x = µ.subject to the condition 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1. Thus









































  − 1
⎤
⎦
21(if this is in the interval [0,1]).





while in the case of country 1
Ω1t(at)=ψ1δπ1 [ϕ1L1 + ϕ2χ2ΓatL2],
The country 2’s innovation rate is the minimum between the desired and con-
straint rates,












f0 is an increasing function so µ2t (at) is decreasing as before. Thus if country 2





















The LHS is decreasing in at while the RHS is increasing. On the other hand,
as at → 0 the LHS is positive while the RHS tends to zero. Thus there is some
a
Spec
2 ≤ 1 below which country 2 specializes.






2t (at)(Γ − 1)
1+ω1µF
1t (at)(Γ − 1)
where µF
1t (at) and µF
2t (at) are given by















































Table I. Probability of innovation in the open economy.
22By construction, functions µF
1t (at), µF
2t (at) are continuous. When they are
non-zero, either µF
1t (at) is strictly increasing or µF
2t (at) is strictly decreasing (or
both). If they are both zero then neither country specializes. Hence unless both
innovation rates are zero, HF (at) is strictly decreasing and there is a unique
solution for HF (a∗)=1 ,g i v e nb yt h es o l u t i o nt oω2µF
2t (at)=ω1µF
1t (at).T h u s
P r o p o s i t i o n1c a r r i e so v e ri n t of o rt h ec a s eo ff r e ec o m m e r c ea sf o l l o w s .
Proposition 3. Under free commerce, countries fall into four groups.
(1) HF (1) > 1.C o u n t r y2 will overtake country 1.
(2) HF (1) ≤ 1 and HF
j (0) ≥ 1.C o u n t r y2 converges in growth rates to country
1. A steady state 0 ≤ a∗ ≤ 1 exists given by HF(a∗)=1 . The steady state is
unique unless both innovation rates are zero, in which case HF =1might hold on
a whole interval. If country 2 is credit constrained then marginal improvements
in ν2 will result in marginal level eﬀects given by marginal rises in a∗.I fc o u n t r y2
is not credit constrained then marginal increments in the productivity parameters
of both countries will have a marginal impact on levels according to the functions
in Table I.
(3) HF
j (0) < 1. In this case the steady state is a∗
j =0 .C o u n t r y2 diverges in
growth rates from country 1 and is specialized in producing innovative products
because country 1’s economy has a comparatively huge demand. The growth rate
is:
lim
t→∞Gjt = Ajt+1/Ajt − 1=( 1+g1) lim
t→∞(at+1/at) − 1












= µ2t(0)(Γ − 1) <g 1.
Any marginal increase in the parameters determining the innovation rate leads to
ag r o w t he ﬀect.




1 = f (ψ1δπ1 (ϕ1L1 + ϕ2a
∗L2))(Γ − 1) (4.14)
which is higher than the autarchic growth rate gA
1 when a∗ > 0. When a∗ =0the
world growth rate reduces to the autarchic growth rate.
Proof. Everything is clear except for the possible interval on which HF =1
if both countries do not innovate. In this case, neither can be specialized in
23innovation. Their eﬀective innovation incentives must satisfy:
max
 




t L1 + ϕ2L2
  
≤ 1,
which holds on some single closed interval or a point, since each function involved
is monotonic.
Proposition 4. I nt h ec a s eo ff r e ec o m m e r c e ,u n l e s sb o t hc o u n t r i e sa r e
stagnant,
(1) Identical countries in symmetric competition, so that ω1 = ω2,h a v et h e
same steady states.
(2) If a country has a higher steady state, it must have an advantage in inno-
vation competition (higher ωj), higher ﬁxed productivity eﬀects ϕj,h i g h e rp r o -
ductivity eﬀects associated with innovation χj, a higher population Lj,ap a r t n e r
country with a higher population, or a better ﬁnancial system νj.
In the case when the measure of winning sectors ω2 (at) is endogenous and
is an increasing function of at with ω2 (0) = ω20 and ω2 (1) = 1
2,t h e ni d e n t i c a l
economies might have diﬀerent steady states.
Proposition 5. Consider identical economies and suppose the process of
innovation competition is such that ω20 (a) > 0 is small enough at any given a.
Then besides the steady state a∗ =1there is a steady state a∗ <a .I nt h ec a s e
a =0this implies that there is a steady state with a lower growth rate.
Proof. In any of the intervals of deﬁnition of µF
1t (at) and µF
2t (at), steady states
occur at (1 − ω2 (a∗))µF
1t (a∗)=ω2 (a∗)µF
2t (a∗).F o rω2 (a) > 0 small enough the
LHS of this equation becomes larger than the RHS, implying that a steady state
a∗ exists satisfying a∗ ≤ a.I fa =0 , if necessary for a smaller ω2 the steady state
is a divergent one.
4.4. Free commerce versus autarchy
We ask whether free commerce is better than autarchy. The model presented here
focuses on the interaction between trade and innovation. However, trade theory
also focuses on the eﬃciency gains due to comparative advantage. To include
these, we suppose that once countries engage in trade the ﬁxed productivity ef-
fects change from ϕj (now ϕA
j )t oϕF
j (“A”, “F” for autarchy and free commerce).
24Suppose the leading country has incentives to innovate and is not credit con-
strained, independently of whether it trades with the second country. Country 1

































Country 1 must not loose too many innovation sectors to country 2.
4.4.1. Lagging country not constrained
When it is not constrained, country 2 will also eﬀectively have a higher eﬀective









.If ω1 = ω2, the steady






























































that is, the worse the autarchic relative ineﬃciency of country 2, the smaller its
market size relative to country 1’s, the higher the force of convergence and the
higher (lower) the eﬃciency of public goods for innovation in country 1 (country








(χ2Γ−1)2χ1 > 0), the better free trade is
compared to autarchy. Also, the larger the relative gain in innovation share ω2/ω1.
254.4.2. Lagging economy constrained
In the constrained case the resources for innovation are exactly the same whether
the lagging economy opens or not, since they depend on the level of ﬁnancial
development and on the wage level. Suppose ﬁrst that ω1 = ω2 and that there are
no eﬃciency gains of trade, so ϕF
j = ϕA
j , j =1 ,2. The increased innovation rate of
country 1 increases the relative lag between the two economies This eﬀect would
be counteracted by eﬃciency gains in country 2 and strengthened by eﬃciency
gains in country 1. It is likely that the credit constrained economy will loose in
relative innovation share ω2/ω1, which would also decrease its steady state level.
4.5. The colonial diktat
According to Beaudreau (2004), who cites Bairoch (1997) the typical “colonial
diktat”, implied (a) colonies could import only products from the metropolis and
tariﬀ rates had to be low, normally 0%; (b) colonial exports could be made only to
the metropolis, from which they could be re-exported; (c) production of manufac-
tured goods that could compete with products of the metropolis was banned, and
(d) transport between colony and metropolis was conducted only on metropolis
ships. Economic policy of the colonies was therefore entirely subjugated to the in-
terests of the metropolis, the most important objective being to prevent industrial
competition from the colony.
Assuming the existence of the colonial diktat, we can prove ﬁrst that, for innov-
ative countries as was Britain during the industrial revolution, colonial possessions
lead to economic growth. Condition (a) in eﬀect set up each empire (the leading
country and its colonies) in competition with the other empires, and enlarged their
market for innovated goods. The incentives for innovation depended positively on
the aggregate colonial population and wealth, implying a higher growth rate for
larger and wealthier empires. Next, we can prove Bairoch’s (1997) assertion that
the “colonial diktat” was the main cause of non-transmission of industrial revolu-
tion outside Europe. Condition (b) in eﬀect limited the incentives for innovation
for lagging countries to their own and their colonial master’s, rather than world
markets. If we interpret (c) as meaning ω1 =1 , ω2 =0 ,t h e nb yP r o p o s i t i o n5
the lagging economy will diverge. Finally, condition (d) on transport means that
innovators would have to negotiate part of their proﬁts to pay for transportation..
Conditions (b) and (d) both shift the curve HF (at) downwards, implying that the
steady states of otherwise identical economies to the leader would be less than 1,
that is, persistent inequality and divergence: underdevelopment.
265. Labor-seeking FDI
Although in the case of free trade low wages w2t compensate for low levels of
knowledge A2t establishing “a level playing ﬁeld” between countries in which con-
vergence is possible, these very asymmetries between countries can nevertheless
give rise to multiple steady states when foreign direct investment is possible. The
ﬁrst case we consider is when innovators have a choice as to which country to
produce in, and can therefore save on labor costs. From the moment research
takes place, innovators target the country in which production is going to take
place, and therefore use their knowledge to perform R&D whose result will be
appropriate for production in that country.
A si nt h ec a s eo ff r e et r a d e ,s u p p o s et h a ta sar e s u l to ft h ei n n o v a t i o np r o c e s s
each country j has innovated in a measure ωjµj of sectors, and that each com-
petitively produced general good is produced in just one country, and that each
country produces competitively in a measure ξj of sectors. Equation (4.1) holds
as before. All goods will still be consumed in equal quantities Yt and at the same
price pt. However now cheaper labor in country j can be accessed by innovators
from the ‘other’ country ˆ j (where : ˆ j =2if j =1and ˆ j =1if j =2 ). Recall,
however that a complement of public goods is necessary for the production of the
innovated good. Suppose country 1 is investing in country 2. Because now the
technological jump involved in implementing the innovated product from country
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, (5.1)
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Lt (i).
The privately perceived production function for FDI investment is:
Yt (i)=ϕ2χ2ΓA1t (i)Lt (i). (5.2)












19The issue here is not whether country 2 produces an adequate amount of public goods.
27Innovators from country 1 will innovate for production in country 2 only if their





where we include equality supposing that country 2 will pay a small amount for
the FDI so as to obtain the technology transfer to be described below.
A similar analysis shows country 2 produces in country 1 if at ≥
χ2
χ1,t h a ti s ,
to obtain the public goods in the case when
χ2
χ1 < 1. For simplicity we assume
χ1 = χ2 = χ so that country 2 never invests in country 1. Hence the condition
f o rc o u n t r y2t or e c e i v eF D Ii sat ≤ 1.
Write indices C, IH, LFDI for quantities special to the ‘Competitive’ ‘innova-
tive produced at home’ and ‘Labor-seeking FDI’ sectors of production.
Suppose ﬁrst that country 1 can produce as much as it wants in country 2.




















pt is aggregate world expenditure. Equating labor demand and supply in




































− ω1µ1t − ω2µ2t ≥ 0.
5.1. Specialization and innovation crowding out
Consider the case in which country 2 does become specialized. FDI ﬁrms make a
higher proﬁtt h a ni n n o v a t i v eﬁrms because πFDI
1 (at)=1 −[χΓ]
−1 at ≥ 1−[χΓ]
−1 =
π2. Hence as labor is rationed between FDI and local innovating ﬁrms, local
innovation is crowded out. This may occur through several mechanisms. FDI ﬁrms
working in sectors ω1 will contract all the labor they need, since their proﬁtm a r g i n
is larger so they can raise wages until local innovator’s proﬁts are eliminated.
Hence either local innovators reduce their innovation rate µ2t so as to demand
less labor or the measure of innovative sectors ω2 of country 2 is reduced. In the
ﬁrst case, at the extreme µ2t i sr e d u c e dt oz e r os oi ne ﬀect ω2 is reduced to zero,
raising ω1 to 1. For simplicity we assume the following one step mechanism takes
place. We suppose that what is reduced is ω2 rather than µ2t,t h e r eb e i n gn o
mechanism of coordination between diﬀerent sectors in country 2. But for any
(measurable) set of sectors that country 2 ceases to perform research in, country 1
does it instead, and the labor shortage remains. Thus a cascade eﬀect occurs and
country 2 must abandon all research. FDI completely crowds out local innovation
as soon as the labor available in country 2 is less than necessary for fulﬁlling the





− ω1µ1t (at) ≤ 0. (5.6)
Thus for SLFDI(at) ≤ 0, country 2 is completely specialized in FDI and ceases
to innovate. This describes the situation of the banana republic. Labor conﬂict
is likely because all workers earn less than their marginal product.
Country 1 must produce any shortfall in the supply of country 2’s innovated
goods by producing these domestically. Suppose FDI labor is equally distributed









so that country 2’s total product is: Y2t = ϕ2χΓA1tL2 out of which a portion
29πFDI
1 (at)Y2t and the remainder is partly used to pay for public goods.20 On the
other hand country 1 distributes its labor (including that used for the production
































(1 − µ1tπ1), (5.9)


























Thus the unrestricted ﬁrst order condition for µ1t is
1=( 1 − µjt)
2ψ1δ
 













π1ϕ1L1 + atϕ2L2 + µ
−1




For any at including at =0this yields a larger innovation rate µ1t and there-
fore world growth rate then the corresponding free trade rate with or without
specialization of country 2 (but with country 1 not specialized).
20This models the concept of a “banana republic”.
305.2. The two-country dynamics with FDI proﬁts and knowledge diﬀu-
sion
For the two-country dynamics, we now include knowledge diﬀusion from FDI.
First, we suppose that even though production of innovated goods has shifted to
country 2, when country 1 innovates the brains of production are still situated in
country 1, so that
A1t+1 =[ 1+ω1µ1t (Γ − 1)]A1t (5.12)











where 0 < Θ(at) < 1 is a diﬀusion parameter. Some knowledge is diﬀused, but not
as much as if the innovation had occurred in the home country. Moreover, I assume
that Θ(at)=θat with 0 < θ < 1.T h i s w a y ,i f at → 0 a ﬁnite rate of diﬀusion
is assumed, and the diﬀusion term is proportional to Γ − at and therefore still
increasing in at. This assumption is supported by a series of empirical studies on
productivity diﬀusion from FDI (See footnote above). Therefore the two-country





1+ω2µ2t (Γ − 1) + θω1µ1t (Γ − at)

















The function HLFDI(at) is no longer monotonic, as was the case for autarchy
and free trade. Diverse conﬁgurations of multiple equilibria are possible,as will
be shown below, even for identical countries. We can prove in general, though,
the existence of steady states a∗ =0 . Recall that for this value of at,c o u n t r y2
is specialized in FDI and performs no research. We can now state the following
proposition.
Proposition 6. Suppose country 1 has a positive growth rate in autarchy. In
the case of labor-seeking FDI, a steady state a∗ =0 .exists if and only if θΓ ≤ Γ−1.
Under these conditions country 1’s growth rate is higher than in autarchy or than
31in free trade with a diverging country 2. Country 2’s growth rate is θµ1tΓ,w h i c h
is less than or equal to country 1’s, µ1t (Γ − 1).
Consider now steady states in which countries 1 and 2 are identical, L1 = L2 =
χj = ϕj =1 , so that πj = π =1− Γ−1, πFDI
1 (at)=1− atΓ−1,a n dνj = ν.
Proposition 7. Consider identical countries 1 and 2 except for population
size, with identical ω1 = ω2 =1 /2. Then an interior steady states is possible
(Figure 1).
Proof of Proposition 7. The proof is by a numerical example. Figure 1 shows
an interior equilibrium a∗ approximately equal to 0.25 with δψ0 =2 .5, δψ1 =0 .25,
θ =0 .5,L 1 = L2 =1 , Γ =2 .85.
6. Market-seeking FDI
FDI is not only motivated by asymmetries in wages w2t.I t m a y a l s o b e t h e
case that products may only be sold if they are produced in the target countries.
Assume that innovators can only sell their products where they are produced.
Now all goods will still be consumed at the same price pt worldwide, but in equal
quantities Yjt only within each country, since competitively produced goods will
in eﬀect be used to transfer proﬁts between countries. Proﬁts for innovated good










Goods innovated in country 1 will be produced for sale in country 2 so long as
at < χ2Γ, which is always the case, since χ2Γ > 1, while goods innovated in




Thus proﬁts for goods innovated by country 1 are:
π1t (i)=π1B1t + π
FDI
1 (at)B2t




2 (at)B1t + π2B2t at ≥ aMFDI,
π2B2t at <a MFDI.
32In Appendix B we derive the aggregate expenditure Bjt/pt for each country,







1+ω1µ1t(Γ−1) at ≤ aMFDI
1+ω2µ2t(Γ−1)+θω1µ1t(Γ−at)
1+ω1µ1t(Γ−1)+θω2µ2t(Γ−at) at >a MFDI . (6.1)
Consider the case of identical countries with χj = ϕj = Lj =1 , ω1 = ω2 =1 /2,
so that πj = π =1− Γ−1, πFDI
1 (at)=1− atΓ−1, πFDI
2 (at)=1− a
−1
t Γ−1.W h e n
only country 1 invests in country 2, that is, at ≤ aMFDI = Γ−1, the unrestricted







Γ−1 (1 − at)at
1+1


















































Proposition 8. Consider identical countries 1 and 2 except for population
size, and suppose that whenever country 2 has enough incentives to innovate
ω1 = ω2 =1 /2. Several types of steady states can occur in the two-country
dynamics. Interior steady states exist in which country 2 may or may not innovate,
and also the zero steady state is possible. (Figures 2.1, 2.2).
Proof of Proposition 8. The proof is by a numerical example. Figure 2.1 shows
a steady state a∗ =0with δψ0 =0 .25, δψ1 =1 5 , θ =0 .3,L 1 = L2 =1 , Γ =2 .857.
F i g u r e2 . 2s h o w sas t e a d ys t a t ea∗ approximately equal to 0.17 obtained by setting
δψ1 =4 0 .T h eﬁgures are calculated in Excel using a numerical method to solve




33It is possible for a rise in FDI spillovers to induce miracle growth. In Figure
3.1 We model this by supposing ﬁr s tt h a tf o r0 ≤ a ≤ 0.2 θ =3 9 , while for
0.2 ≤ a ≤ 1 θ =0 .70. Choosing δψ0 =0 .5, δψ1 =3 ,L 1 = L2 =1 , Γ =1 .6 for the
other parameters, a∗ is 0.05 approximately. At this level the FDI spillover has
the low value. Figure 3.1 shows that the country will experience an episode of
miracle growth taking it to a∗ about 0.72 if it raises its θ to 0.70, a steady state
with innovation. With slightly diﬀerent parameters (δψ1 =2 .5,l o wa n dh i g hθ
values 0.3,a n d0.6), Figure 3.2 shows a similar trajectory, but from a divergent
steady state a∗ =0to a∗ approximately 0.57 but without innovation.
7. Conclusions
Present day globalization is characterized by free commerce and foreign invest-
ment. Our model shows that both labor- and market- seeking FDI result in
unequal incentives for innovation that give leading countries an advantage. FDI
spillovers may not be enough compensation for lagging countries. As a result, low
steady states may result even between countries identical in all respects except
for their initial conditions. Two kinds of lower steady states, or underdevelop-
ment, are found. In the lowest, the lagging economy will have a lower growth
rate than the leading economy. This implies that any policy improving the in-
novation rate, either directly or indirectly, will have growth eﬀects. There are
also middle steady states, in which technological levels maintain a ﬁxed relative
lag in relation to leading countries. In this case policies improving the innova-
tion rate directly or indirectly will have level eﬀects. Since identical countries
can have diﬀerent steady states in the open economy implies that diﬀerences in
country characteristics need not be the fundamental cause of persistent inequality
and divergence. Our model also explains why the typical colonial diktat imposed
by Great Britain in the 19th and early 20th Centuries during the ﬁrst period of
globalization, limiting a colony’s markets and transportation options, or directly
outruling industrial competition from them, generated persistent inequality and
divergence. By contrast, in the case of autarchy, or in the case of free commerce
without any asymmetric mechanisms, multiple steady states will only arise when
country parameters diﬀer.
We thus in eﬀect provide a Schumpeterian theory of underdevelopment in the
open economy from the industrial revolution to the present day. Development is
innovative leadership in world markets, underdevelopment the lack thereof. In the
presence of FDI, lagging countries may ﬁnd the number of sectors they dominate
34limited by innovation crowding out or unequal incentives for innovation. Theories
ﬁnding that free trade and investment across countries lead to equalization in
growth rates and productivity levels are usually based on competitive markets
and on production functions facing diminishing returns. In these situations the
tendency to equilibrium usually generates convergence. Innovation, however, is
driven by incentives derived from market power. Public policy must curb abuses
or distortions which might derive from such power: the principle behind anti-
trust law. In the case of international trade and investment, the same principle
holds. Competition between equals – even if each is a huge consortium – may be
beneﬁcial. But when important asymmetries arise, the long-term independence
and development of the weak must be safeguarded. Access to markets and cheap
labor must be compensated with the transfer of knowledge. Policies guaranteeing
technological development must be in place for globalization to successfully raise
incomes. Globalization is not a zero-sum game. All countries – as well as the
world rate of growth – will beneﬁt from trading with developed rather than
underdeveloped countries.
If underdevelopment consists of a technological trap, as is proposed here, it
is very important to recognize this. For unlocking the trap will lead to mira-
cle growth and enormous welfare gains, while ignoring it may doom misjudged
economic policies.
358. Appendix A Ineﬃciency of innovation races
Suppose that two ith innovators, one from country 1 and the other from country 2,
attempt to innovation for good i in each country. We model a simple innovation
race to show that the probability of innovation is higher if only one country
innovates, independently of their. This implies that resources are liberated if the
ﬁrms agree to cooperate instead of competing.





This is a measure of the resource levels that eﬀectively have an impact on the
probability of innovation. Suppose that the total probability that an innovation









Suppose that the ﬁrm achieving the innovation ﬁrst wins the race, and that the




Then each country has the probability




of winning the race. Note Ψj(0) = 0,Ψj < 1,Ψ 
j > 0,Ψ  
j < 0 as before. Also,
write ˆ j for the index of the ‘other’ country:
ˆ j =
 
2 if j =1 ,













36Accordingly, suppose each ﬁrm faces unconstrained ﬁrst order maximization con-
ditions:
(1 + nˆ jt−1)Ωjt
(1 + njt−1 + nˆ jt−1)
2 =1 . (8.1)
Clearly each country invests less in innovation and has a lower probability of
obtaining an innovation, due to the competing ﬁrm in the other country. The
ﬁrm in country j will only innovate if Ωjt ≥ 1+nˆ jt−1.
Proposition A.1. In the presence of this innovation race, the total probability
of innovation is less than if only one of the individuals performed R&D.
Proof. We need only consider the case in which both ﬁrms do research. Adding
the equations for j =1 , 2,










In the presence of an innovation race, eﬀective resources dedicated to innovation
are given by the positive root of this quadratic equation,














  . (8.3)
In the absence of a race, eﬀective resources dedicated to unconstrained innovation










































379. Appendix B Dynamic System under Market Seeking FDI
Consider ﬁrst the case when at <a MFDI so only country 1 invests in country
2. Hence in sectors in which country 2 has innovated, country 1 uses its own
competitive production. Suppose that country 1 underproduces in the remaining
sectors, while country 2 overproduces the same amount, which is transferred from
country 2 to country 1 as payment for proﬁts from country 1’s investment in
country 2. Using labor intensities (5.3) as before, the demand and supply for
labor in each country, taking into account labor used for the production of public
goods, is now
L1 =[ ( 1− ω1µ1t − ω2µ2t)(1− τ1t)+ω1µ1t + ω2µ2t]
B1t
ϕ1A1tpt
L2 =[ ( 1− ω1µ1t − ω2µ2t)(1+τ2t)+ω2µ2t + ω1µ1t]
B2t
ϕ2A2tpt

















Substituting in the equation for L2,
L2ϕ2A2tpt
B2t











































































1 (at) − π2 =[ χ2Γ]
−1 (1 − at) > 0 so the ith innovator from
country 1 always makes a higher proﬁt. Under alternative conditions on innovation
races this could lead to innovation crowding out.
Consider now the case when at ≥ aMFDI so both countries invest in each other.
In those sectors in which neither country has innovated, country 1 underproduces
by some amount (which could be negative), while country 2 overproduces by the
same amount, which is transferred from country 2 to country 1 as payment for net
proﬁts. Using labor intensities (5.3) as before, the demand and supply for labor
in each country now clear when
L1 =[ ( 1− ω1µ1t − ω2µ2t)(1− τ1t)+ω1µ1t + ω2µ2t] B1t
ϕ1A1tpt


























































and write Λj = ωjµjtπFDI







































2 (at)((1 + Λ1)L1ϕ1A1t + Λ1L2ϕ2A2t)
1+Λ1 + Λ2
+























1+ω1µ1t(Γ−1) at ≤ aMFDI
1+ω2µ2t(Γ−1)+θω1µ1t(Γ−at)
1+ω1µ1t(Γ−1)+θω2µ2t(Γ−at) at >a MFDI . (9.1)
Consider identical countries with χj = ϕj = Lj =1 , ω1 = ω2 =1 /2,s ot h a t
πj = π =1− Γ−1, πFDI
















= π1 (1 + at)+
 
πFDI






= π1 (1 + at)+











Γ−1 (1 − at)at
1+1
2µ1t (1 − atΓ−1)
 
=1

























































































To solve these simultaneous cubic equations for Proposition 8 we solve for the
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American 9508 3846 0 0 350 52 611 14367
European 3636 11881 0 0 520 1077 1240 18354
Japanese 2851 811 10049 0 1251 88 39 15089
S Korea 0 0 0 1954 28 150 0 2132
Pacific 0 0 0 0 756 0 0 756
Other Europe  0 0 0 0 0 792 0 792
South America - - - - - - - -












Data Source: ILO (2000).
Table 1. Consolidated World Motor Vehicle Production by Nationality of Origin and Consumption, 1998 
(thousand units)
ConsumersFigure 1. Multiple Equilibria due to Labor-Seeking 
FDI for Economies with Identical Parameters


























Innovation Rate: Country 1
Innovation Rate: Country 2






0 * 2 > a 0 * 1 > a
Motion
Innovation Crowding OutFigure 2. Multiple Equilibria due to Market-Seeking FDI for Economies 
with Identical Parameters
Figure 2.2 Country 2 has Two Equilibria:       
1) Divergent; 2) Parallely Lagging
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Innovation Rate: Country 1
Innovation Rate: Country 2















Crowding OutFigure 3. Multiple Equilibria due to Market-Seeking FDI for Identical Economies
Figure 3.1 Country 2, at a Low Parallel Steady State, 
Raises FDI Technological Transfer and Grows to an 
Innovative Steady State
Figure 3.2 Country 2, at a Divergent Steady State, Raises 
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0 * 2 > a 0 * 1 > a
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0 * 2 > a 0 * 1 = a
No Innovation 
in Country 2 